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He is Risen – 5.2.2: Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence (sort of)

Aug 17th, 2025

emphasis on sort of
Below are some helpful considerations to keep in mind when evaluating ‘evidence’.

What is evidence?

I’m not interested in debating definitions of evidence, so I’ll just rely on a rather neutral source to give me a definition – the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy should do:

“Evidence, whatever else it is, is the kind of thing which can make a difference to what one is justified in believing or (what is often, but not always, taken to be the same thing) what it is reasonable for one to believe.”

(Kelly, 2016)

Along this vein, evidence essentially confers justification – it makes something reasonable to believe, and it sort of functions as a physical or objective reason.

Does testimony count as evidence?

The following are snippets of a really good video put out by Emerson Green. No use reinventing the wheel. I think he makes good points. All credit for the points in this ‘Does testimony count as evidence’ section goes to him.

“First, what is testimony? It’s very simple: testimony is when other people tell you things – that’s it...Testimony can be unreliable. People make honest mistakes, they’re subject to biases, their faculties can mislead them – not to mention, people sometimes people lie. Even setting that possibility aside, we have hard evidence that eyewitness testimony, for example, is unreliable.

Of course, none of these people actually conducted those experiments themselves. They hear about that hard evidence on podcasts, YouTube channels, articles, and so on. Then they believe that you can’t trust testimony on the basis of the testimony they received about its untrustworthiness.

No one thinks testimonial evidence is the top-shelf gold standard of evidence, that it’s irrefutable proof, or that it couldn’t possibly be misleading. So why do skeptics think it’s so damning to point out that testimony is not an infallible guide to truth? There’s a gap between “X is fallible” and “X provides no justification for anything.”

Testimony does provide some justification, and it’s fallible. It’s not unique in that way. Our senses are fallible—does that mean that our senses can’t provide evidential support for anything? Of course not. They’re fallible, and they confer justification. Scientific instruments are also fallible—does that mean we should toss out results produced by scientific instruments? The experts in a given field are also fallible, and so on. The fact that testimony is fallible is not enough to justify the idea that testimony provides no justification for a given belief…To quote Michael Huemer: “Almost all my interesting knowledge about the world is based on testimony. I know, for example, that the Earth is about 4.5 billion years old, that Japan is a country…I didn’t figure out any of that myself; I learned all of it from other people. Without testimony, practically none of my current beliefs would be justified.”

Without testimony, how would we learn about most history? How would we learn about scientific findings that we didn’t discover personally? Really, how would we know about much of anything outside our immediate field of awareness? Some philosophers argue that you’re justified in trusting testimonial evidence by default—that’s our starting point. The default is to trust it, to assume that what people are saying is by and large true or at least reasonable to think given the evidence they have available to them. That’s the beginning assumption, and we’d need specific grounds to doubt a piece of testimonial evidence, not to trust it.

Just to reiterate the point that’s going to preclude 90% of the skeptical objections to this. You’re justified in trusting testimony by default as long as you have no specific grounds for doubt about a given piece of testimony.

But why would you think it’s definitely true? Well, I didn’t say that. I said you are justified in trusting testimony by default. I didn’t say it was definitely true. But what if they have an extensive history of lying about the subject? That would be a good reason for doubt. Their testimony claimed to have built a perpetual motion machine that contradicts the laws of thermodynamics? Yeah, that sounds like a pretty good reason to doubt their testimony. Again, you’re justified in trusting testimony by default as long as you have no specific grounds for doubt….

Another reason we might be entitled to trust testimony by default is the principle of charity in interpretation, which holds that one must try to interpret other people’s words in a way that makes their statements by and large correct or at least reasonable. Ordinary communication would be nearly impossible without this presumption. When someone makes a claim, we assume, all else equal, that they’re telling the truth. We also assume they’re using words in a normal way—in the same way that we assume that you’re using words in a standard, mutually understood way until given reason to think otherwise. We also assume that you’re telling us how the world seems to you until we have reason to think otherwise. Both are built into our ability to interpret what anyone else is saying. If we start by taking no one’s word for anything and not believing that your testimony correlates at all with how the world seems to you, then communication and understanding would break down entirely.”

(Green, 2023)

I think we can give a resounding ‘yes’. Testimony does count as evidence, given that it can confer justification. Of course, the quality of the testimony, the nature of the claim, and some other things need to be considered, but yes, although fallible, testimony does in fact count as evidence for a claim. Of course, a given testimony can support multiple claims, as a result of which the final matter may remain underdetermined if it does not support one claim any more so than another.

Do extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence?

Kinda, but it depends on what you mean. Joe Schmid explains this pretty well.

Remember the little bit of maths that I introduced in the last post – Bayes theorem? It went a little like this:

P(A|B) = $\frac{P(B|A) \cdot P(A)}{P(B)}$

The point to be made is quite simple – if you drop P(A) – i.e., if an event becomes more improbable (and more along the lines of extraordinary), to maintain the same posterior probability (P(A|B)) – that is, the probability given the evidence, one must provide evidence that strongly supports A (i.e., increase P(B|A) by the same proportion). That’s about it – it’s quite intuitive.

The problem with a lot of presentations of this argument is that they implicitly claim that the nature of the evidence itself should also be ‘miraculous’ to some extent – but the issue with this approach is that it can quite easily create an insurmountable epistemic barrier. It’s a problem encountered as a consequence of many sceptical worldviews – if you drop P(A) low enough, then the quality of evidence required to maintain P(A|B) must be increased by the same proportion.

More simply, if one asserts that the evidence itself for a miracle (B) should be extraordinary, then it’s not hard to close yourself off to potential truths – e.g., if you dogmatically claim that we should have 4k HD pictures of Jesus walking out of the tomb. Ultimately, whether this is something one wants to do is up to them. Still, it’s counterintuitive to anyone that values rational inquiry – you should want to maintain an epistemological system that doesn’t close you off to potential truths at all. To reiterate a point stated earlier – it’s also sufficient to show that alternative naturalistic explanations are less expected given the evidence to justify the Christian position. It could be the case that P(A|B) = 0.05 – but if P(A’|B) is 0.01, then the Christian argument should be favoured.

Next will be to show that the God that causes miracles, is the same God that rose from the dead, but that’s gonna take a while 😊

Type your email…

Sources:

Kelly, T. (2016) ‘Evidence’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). Available at: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/evidence/ (Accessed: 15 March 2025).

Green, E (2023) ‘5 Mistakes Atheists Make About Epistemology’. – YouTube. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4dalQu-vdMU (Accessed: 15 March 2025).
He is Risen – 5.2.1: The Metaphysics of Miracles

Jul 27th, 2025
If you look on the web, or listen to many videos on this topic, you’ll hear definitions of miracles such as “a contradiction of the laws of nature”, or “an extraordinary event manifesting divine intervention in human affairs” (as the Merriam-Webster dictionary puts it). But what really is a miracle? Is there any point even entertaining their possibility? How do they happen? I hereby detail the classical theistic view.

A brief introduction to logic is in order. Philosophers, mathematicians and logicians recognise three fundamental laws of classical logic:
1. Identity: a proposition is identical to itself.
2. Non-contradiction: two opposing propositions (claims about reality) cannot both be true at the same time and in the same respect.
3. Excluded Middle: a proposition is either true or false – there is no third/”middle” option.
Hume doesn’t really make sense

18^th century Scottish philosopher David Hume popularised the definition of a miracle being “a violation of the laws of nature”. Stephen Hawking claimed that the laws of nature should “should hold everywhere and at all times; otherwise they wouldn’t be laws. There could be no exceptions or miracles”. However, I think these two takes get things a little confused, and with good reason.

Firstly, it’s common knowledge nowadays among physicists that these so-called “laws of nature” fundamentally break down at the Big-Bang. I’m not claiming the Big-Bang was the beginning of creation (as that’s not my current point), I’m simply stating that there was a point in time where the laws of nature that we observe now were not as universal as Mr. Hawking would have liked.

Laws of logic, on the other hand, are universal and inviolable. They hold at all times and at all places and, as a matter of fact, the laws of nature depend on them. For example, the strong nuclear force cannot be both 147.08 times the value of the electrostatic force coupling constant α and 300 times the value of the electrostatic force coupling constant α in the same atomic nucleus at the same instant. Notice how this presupposes both the first and second laws of logic (identity and non-contradiction) and implies the third.

Secondly, Hume elsewhere characterises the laws of nature as regular descriptions as opposed to prescriptions of how the world works. Hume writes:

“Some events are found, in all countries and all ages, to have been constantly conjoined together: Others are found to have been more variable, and sometimes to disappoint our expectations; so that, in our reasonings concerning matter of fact, there are all imaginable degrees of assurance, from the highest certainty to the lowest species of moral evidence.”
Part 1 of Section X, Of Miracles, in An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding

Essentially, Hume’s scepticism about our ability to have certainty forces him to adopt a position that: although we might have high confidence in the laws of nature (due to our experiencing them most often), that’s all we can have – high confidence, and no knowledge of necessity. Ultimately, they can never be said to rise from descriptions to prescriptions. Ignoring the presuppositions required for one to even trust their reasoning faculties to make this inference, it’s hard to see how an event that runs contrary to a description of the world (what a miracle would be in this case) is logically impossible.

So… what are miracles?

Miracles could, in theory, relate to deviations or changes in the laws of nature, but not the laws of logic, so if your gripe is that these laws regarding miracles can’t change – not only is that not true, but so far there is no reason to write them off.

Regarding the state of laws of nature, I would agree with Dr. Ed Feser, who writes:

“There could have been a world without water, fire, acorns, or dogs in it in the first place, but which did have entities which in certain superficial ways resembled these things. In that sense the laws of nature that actually obtain need not have obtained, and are therefore to that extent contingent. But there couldn’t have been a world which really had water, fire acorns, and dogs in it but where these things did not naturally behave in the ways they in fact do behave“

Feser, E. (2017). Five Proofs of the Existence of God, p213. Ignatius Press

More simply put, laws of nature are necessary in every possible world, but the specific laws that obtain in a given world are dependent on the things that exist.

Having said this, it makes sense to say that the laws of nature are the laws of natures. To get a bit technical, things have inherent dispositions (natures), which they can exhibit. Loosely, these dispositions define what a certain thing is and distinguish it from other things. For example, humans are rational animals, and as such can exhibit rationality (reasoning capacities), and animality (animalistic capacities).^[4]

Some brief notes on essentialism:
- It should be noted that in an essentialist framework, the manifestation of a disposition might not occur – it might be blocked or lack the requisite triggers. An example might be humour – a human might have the ability to laugh, but it doesn’t mean that they always will (it could be argued that other animals laugh, but you get the gist). Also, certain types of characteristics can be predicated (or ‘assigned’) to an object in different ways. For example, “rationality” (reason-driven thought, reflection, and decision-making) is an essential predicate – i.e., the ability is present in all humans in the same inherent capacity (that doesn’t mean we all make the same decisions), however something like the number of toes one has would be an accidental predicate – it can be absent without destroying the essence of something. There are some other categories, but I just wanted to make this point.
Returning to the main topic, this would mean that strict violations (such as those Hume suggested) are impossible. A miracle, I contend, is not merely an exception to that which is natural (since that would be true for defective objects too, such as an apple tree that is missing its fruit), miracles are exceptions that are super-natural, “they are not contrary to nature, they are beyond nature” – Ramelow, “God of Miracles” (p314-15).

On this view, miracles require God. They have as their cause, something which is outside the natural order altogether-miracles can only have a divine cause and must not be confused with the extraordinary but still merely preternatural effects that an Angel (for example) might produce (Feser, 2017).

As proven in post 5.1.1 and 5.1.2, God is not one being among others in the sense that he has a nature and really distinct existence among other creatures – he is a categorically distinct being that simply is. Considering we are arguing for a cause ‘beyond nature’, its only source, in the classical theist’s eyes, is God – that which is beyond natural and preternatural causes, and the ultimate explanatory cause for all of existence.

If this is the case, then we can note something rather simple, but profound:

Miracles can be neither “violations” or “interventions” (when properly stated), considering God cannot ‘interfere’ with the universe.

This would be due to the fact that God is not an ‘alternative’ to the universe (as both of ‘violations’ and ‘interventions’ would suggest), rather, God is the cause of the universe. It doesn’t really make sense to say that God steps in, muddles around with the controls a bit, and then disappears. Rather, everything is ultimately dependent upon him for its existence in a given moment.

With this in mind, it makes more sense to consider miracles as ‘suspensions’ of laws, rather than ‘violations’ – or what happens when God doesn’t let “natural” causes run their course. Classical Theists believe that, for example, with Shadrach, Meshach and Abednego’s not being burned in the furnace, when fire burns something, it does so because^[1]:
1. Fire has an intrinsic power to burn (due to its nature).
2. God sustains fire in existence.
3. God concurs with its causal activity, allowing its power to produce its effect.
  - If God doesn’t do this, then although fire retains its intrinsic power to burn (otherwise it would no longer be fire), it doesn’t burn anything. Fire retains its natural power to burn, but in this particular case, God withholds His concurrence, so its power does not actualize in burning them.
Clearly, if any of these three requirements fails to be the case, fire doesn’t “fire”.

Are miracles improbable?

This section is a summary of section 8.3 in Andrew Loke’s Investigating the Resurrection of Jesus Christ

Let’s say you agree that miracles are possible, but just so hopelessly improbable that they may as well be impossible. For example, our old friend David Hume writes (regarding Jesus’ resurrection):

“But it is a miracle that a dead man should come to life; because that has never been observed, in any age or country. There must, therefore, be a uniform experience against every miraculous event, otherwise the event would not merit that appellation.”

Hume, 1748 – An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (p.87)

A problem with Hume’s claim, though, is that it’s begging the question. He essentially claims miracles haven’t happened (or are at most improbable) because they have never been observed – but that’s the exact point in question. We’re trying to find out whether miracles are probable or happen – we can’t say “they are improbable because they have never been observed”.

A sceptic could modify the argument by using a frequentist notion of probability – essentially saying that the ratio of the frequences of miracle to non-miracle events makes it such that historians (who can only establish what probably happened) cannot establish that a miracle occurred (again, presupposing that miracles are highly improbable due to our experience).

The problem with this modified approach is, to put it simply, how do you know? Mike Licona, a New Testament scholar, writes:

“how does the nontheist historian know this? Testimonies of God’s intervention in history occur with every claim to answered prayer. Although many claims of God’s intervention could in reality be coincidence, many claims of coincidence could in reality be God’s intervention”
(Licona, 2010)

Obviously, I am not claiming that all instances of purported answered prayer are miraculous – I am just highlighting the imprudence of brazenly claiming that miracles are by definition improbable. Based on the above sections, I think there is good reason to do away with that definition, but also due to the fact that a publication from some years ago by Harvard University Press notes a survey indicating that 73% of US medical doctors think that miraculous healing occurs today (or at least, at the time of the survey) (Brown, 2012). As a matter of fact, the survey also notes that there have been documented cases of tumours disappearing and the blind healed after prayer – sceptics would need to assess these cases before making sweeping claims. What’s also relevant is the background information – this is something that can be explained using Bayes’ rule:

P(A|B) = $\frac{P(B|A) \cdot P(A)}{P(B)}$

Let’s say A refers to the event that Jesus rose from the dead and so A’ refers to the event that he did not, and let’s say B refers to the background information (which you’ll see in section 6). This says that the probability of Jesus having risen from the dead, given the background information (P(A|B)) is equal to the probability of the background information given Jesus having risen from the dead (P(B|A)) multiplied by the probability that Jesus rose from the dead (P(A)) divided by the probability of the background information.

Calculating this for the reverse, we can note that:

P(A’|B) = $\frac{P(B|A') \cdot P(A')}{P(B)}$

Since both calculations are divided by P(B), we can ignore that and just say that P(A|B) = (P(B|A) * P(A)).

Using some arbitrary but reasonable values – let’s say:
- P(B|A) = 0.95 (and I think there is good reason to believe it’s higher)
- P(A) = 0.05
- P(A’) = 1 – P(A’) = 0.95
- P(B|A’) = 0.05 (there’s good reason to think it’s at least this low, or far lower)
Here we get P(A|B) = (0.95 * 0.05) = 0.0475. We also get P(A’|B) = (0.95 * 0.05) = 0.0475. Of course, the probabilities provided above are arbitrary (although I think they’re not that far off their true values). Note that although the probability of Jesus having risen from the dead alone (P(A)), is very small (0.05), when taking into account the background information, we realise that when comparing it to the probability that he did not (also taking into account the background information), the probabilities of the respective events (in this case) become equal. That’s the power of background information!

I suppose I’ll leave it there. I think I’ve shown that the common definition of miracles doesn’t really work, along with having given good reason to accept God’s existence and how, metaphysically, miracles actually occur – along with decent reason to think (if good enough evidence is presented) that miracles can actually happen.

Type your email…

Sources:
1. Summa Theologiae I, q. 105, a. 5.
2. Parts of the “So what are miracles?” section are generally taken from Ed Feser’s Miracles section in Chapter 6 of Five Proofs of the Existence of God
3. Feser, E., 2017. Five proofs of the existence of God. Ignatius Press.
4. For a detailed exposition of how essentialism (the name of this position) works, interested readers might want to check out the “Essentialism” chapter (section 4.1) in Scholastic Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction, by Ed Feser.
5. Licona, Michael. 2010. The Resurrection of Jesus: A New Historiographical Approach. Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic.
6. Brown, Candy Gunther. 2012. Testing Prayer: Science and Healing. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
He is Risen – 5.1.2: A Strange, but Powerful Argument for God, ft. Aquinas, Aristotle, prod. Dr. Feser (2/2)

Jul 6th, 2025
*AI Generated image*

“Now what?”

Good question. Now would be a good point to summarise what we’ve confirmed so far, but doing so would cut out necessary detail to the point that the argument presented wouldn’t have much force. If you’re just joining here, you can skim through the numbered points of the previous post and get a general gist of how we got here.

Stage 2: Concluding on stuff

In points 6-8 of the previous post, we proved that whatever this subsistent existence is, there can only, in principle, be one of them. Thus far, we know that this cause is unique and uncaused, but can we know anything else?

Well, we know that since there can only be one of these subsistent existences, that everything that is not this subsistent existence, must have a real distinction between its essence and existence, but that also means that at any point in time, everything that is not this subsistent existence is dependent on it for its existence. We also know from previous reflection that this subsistent existence is necessarily existing as (1) it is uncaused, and (2) its essence is its existence – its “definition” genuinely is existence – it could not fail to exist. Let’s scribble this down:
1. Since there cannot, in principle, be more than one thing the essence of which is identical to its existence, this cause (which is subsistent existence itself) is unique.
2. Since it is unique, anything other than it that exists must be something the essence of which is distinct from its existence.
3. Anything the essence of which is distinct from its existence will, either directly or indirectly, have its existence imparted to it by a cause which is subsistent existence itself.
4. So, this unique cause which is subsistent existence itself is the cause of everything other than itself.
5. Since whatever lacks a real distinction between its essence and existence would exist in a necessary way rather than a contingent way, this unique cause which is subsistent existence itself exists in a necessary way.
6. Whatever is subsistent existence itself need not and could not have a cause of its own.
7. So, this unique cause, which is subsistent existence itself, is uncaused.
Now, consider this – the things of our experience whose essence is distinct from their existence are related by actuality and potentiality.

What on earth does that mean, you ask?

These are terms coined by Aristotle. To summarise:
- Actuality describes how something is at a given instant. For example, a coffee cup you hold in your hand might be hot.
- Potentiality describes how something could be. The same coffee cup could be warm, cold, frozen, etc – but for obvious reasons, it can’t be cold and hot at the same time. It’s only when something that is actually cold (such as ice) actualizes, the mug’s potential to be cold, that it becomes cold (albeit slowly).^[1]
Brace yourself, because I’m about to use the words “potential” and “actual” about a thousand times from here on out.

Similarly, essence and existence are related by potentiality and actuality. Something’s essence (at least, when it is really distinct to its existence) only really amounts to a potential thing – it could or could not be. It’s only when something actualizes its potential to exist (gives it existence) that it actually exists. We could then just say that existence is a kind of actuality, right?

If that’s the case, then something that is subsistent existence itself can be similarly considered to be pure actuality with no potentiality. This makes sense, because whatever this thing is, it is uncaused and could have no cause (as we have already noted) – it has no potentiality for existence. Formally:
1. If that which is subsistent existence itself had some potentiality for existence which needed to be actualised, the existence would have to be imparted to it by some other cause.
2. So, that which is subsistent existence itself has no potential for existence which needs actualisation but rather exists in a purely actual way.
So, if this purely actual being has no potential for existence, and its essence is identical to its existence, it can’t change – i.e., it’s immutable. Since existing strictly within time entails changeability, an immutable cause must also be eternal. It doesn’t “come to be” or “pass away”. It simply is. Furthermore, since being material (physical) also entails changeability (in size, shape, temperature, any material factor), this cause must also be immaterial, or incorporeal.

Onto the next big question. What is perfection?

Probably a year ago now I wrote an analysis of Slavery in the Old Testament, in which I also gave a definition of goodness. Part of this definition said goodness can be characterised as “the true actualisation of a subject’s potential – how well a subject reflects its ordained purpose”. You might not agree with this completely, but I think you’d agree that it’s at least reasonable. If someone doesn’t do what they’re supposed to do in some respect, then (depending on the matter of course), this is often considered a bad thing. Similarly, with objects (such as a phone with a broken screen), if they don’t work as they are intended, they are often considered defective, or imperfect. A defect like this is called a privation – the absence of some feature a thing would naturally require to be “complete”. It involves the failure to realise some potential inherent in something.

On the flip side, if something were to be perfect, it wouldn’t have any privations or potential to fulfil and would possess maximal perfection. Since this cause is purely actual, it is maximally perfect, and fully good (as long as you consider goodness a perfection). Let’s summarize:
1. For this purely actual cause to be capable of change, it would have to have potentials capable of actualisation.
2. However, it is purely actual, so it lacks such potentials.
3. So, it is immutable.
4. If this purely actual cause existed in time, then it would be capable of change, which it is not.
5. So, it is immaterial.
6. If this purely actual cause were corporeal, then it would be material, which it is not.
7. So, the purely actual cause is not corporeal.
8. If the purely actual cause were imperfect in any way, it would have some unactualized potential, which being purely actual it does not have.
9. So, the purely actual cause is perfect, or maximally perfect.
10. For something to be less than fully good is for it to have a privation – that is, to fail to actualise some feature proper to it.
11. The purely actual cause has no privation (which is an unactualized potential)
12. So, the purely actual cause is fully good.
Moving onto power.

I think it’s reasonable to say that power is the ability to make something happen, or more formally, the ability to actualise some potential – to make something potential, actually the case. If the purely actual cause is the source of all existence except itself, and therefore (in some form) the source of all actualising power, it is omnipotent.
1. To have power entails being able to actualise potential.
2. Change is the actualisation of a potential, and actualises something’s potential to exist in a certain way.
3. Any potential, including a potential for existence, that is actualised is either actualised by the purely actual cause or a series of actual causes which terminates in the purely actual cause.
4. So, all power derives from the purely actual cause
5. But to be that from which all power derives is to be omnipotent.
6. So, the purely actual cause is omnipotent.
But, what on earth is this thing? Is it personal? Or is it just like the Sun, providing heat but pretty silent? There’s actually good reason to attribute intelligence to this cause, but first, we need to have some notion, or idea of that intelligence even is.

Traditionally (in the philosophical setting), intelligence involves:
1. The ability to grasp concepts (e.g., the concept man – but not just a particular man, what it is to be a man in general – the universal idea that applies to all men, such as certain biological characteristics)
2. The ability to merge concepts (e.g., the ability to combine man and mortal into the thought all men are mortal)
3. The ability to infer one thought from the others (e.g., all men are mortal -> Socrates is a man -> Socrates is mortal)
Clearly, (1) is the most important, since (2) and (3) are dependent on it. It’s no use trying to merge concepts that you can’t grasp, or infer conclusions.

Continuing, it seems quite clear that concepts can be considered to be some kind of pattern, or form, that we are able to memorise and apply to multiple individuals.

Naturally, when these forms/patterns come to exist in material things, the results are those exact material objects, but when we think more generally about these forms or patterns, we are able to abstract away from all the different particular men we know and focus on the general pattern common to all men. This is the essence of strictly intellectual activity – the ability to have the universal or abstract form or pattern of a thing without being that kind of thing.

Hold that thought for a minute – we need to delve a little more into cause and effect to see where I’m going with this.

We briefly noted earlier that when something changes or caused to exist, a potential is actualised, and that something already actual must have actualised it – this principle can be referred to as the principle of causality. The principle of proportionate causality extends upon this quite logically, saying that a cause cannot give something that it does not have to an effect (even if it’s not present in the cause in the exact same way). A basic example might be that, I can’t give you a calculator if I myself do not have one, but there are three ways an effect can be present in its cause before it ends up in the effect. Let’s use the example of me giving you £20 (don’t get excited):
1. Formally – Quite straightforward. I have a £20 note and give it to you, or two £10 notes, or four £5 notes (etcetera). I pass an instance of the form/pattern of £20 to you.
2. Virtually – Here, I might not have £20 physically, but I might be able to Bank Transfer it – i.e., I don’t have the money on hand, but I have the power to get a hold of it.
3. Eminently – Because of my glorious industry connections, I convince the Bank of England to let me manufacture my own £20 notes and give one to you. Here, not only do I have the ability to acquire already existing £20 notes, but I have the power to cause these to exist in the first place.
I’d contend that with regard to any effect, whatever is in it must have been in the cause in any of these three ways – going back to our purely actual cause, since everything that exists is going to trace its existence back to it (as it is the cause of everything other than itself), it would also need to be the cause (in some way) of all of the patterns, forms, or essences that everything materialises as, but not just what they are actually, what they are potentially – it doesn’t matter what a given thing materialises as, it must first be present (in some form) in this purely actual cause lying at the other end of the causal chain. To pause and summarize:
1. Whatever is in an effect is in its cause in some way, whether formally, virtually, or eminently (according to the principle of proportionate causality).
2. So, the purely actual cause is the cause of all things.
3. So, the forms or patterns manifest in all the things it causes must in some way be in the purely actual actualizer.
I think it’s quite clear that the forms/patterns of things must exist in the purely actual cause in a universal, or abstract way – similarly to how we are able to extract universal ideas about objects as stated before. If the purely actual cause is able to do this, then it’s obvious how they can cause every possible pattern or form to actually exist, since they have the general pattern of everything that exists (somehow).

If you’re have a good memory, you’ll notice that this is exactly that capacity that is fundamental to intelligence – the ability to grasp concepts. Not just that, but it’s also the case that this purely actual cause must cause the relations between things – i.e., it doesn’t just cause men, but it also causes the fact that all men are mortal, or a cat being on that mat. But doesn’t this sound like something – like a thought? This would mean that everything that actually exists, exists in the purely actual cause in the same way a thought or plan might exist in our mind before we do it – at least eminently or virtually if not formally (since God is not a man, or a cat, as he is not material).

This sounds a lot like another divine attribute – omniscience. And that’s what it is! Every possible pattern, or form, or essence exists in this purely actual cause in some way analogous to the way a thought exists in us.
1. The forms or patterns can exist either in the concrete way in which they exist in particular things, or in an abstract way (intellectual).
2. They cannot exist in the purely actual way in the same way they exist in individual things (formally), as something would cause itself otherwise.
3. So, they must exist in an abstract (intellectual) way.
4. So, the purely actual actualizer has intellect/intelligence.
5. Since it is the forms/patterns of all things that are in the thought of this intellect, there is nothing that is outside the range of those thoughts.
6. For nothing to be outside of those thoughts is for that thing to be omniscient.
7. So the purely actual cause is omniscient.
8. So each of the things of our experience has its existence imparted to it at every moment by a cause which is subsistent existence itself, one, necessarily existing, an (or better said, “the”) uncaused cause of everything other than itself, purely actual, immutable, eternal immaterial, incorporeal, perfect, omnipotent, fully good, intelligent, and omniscient.
9. But for there to be such a cause is for God to exist.
10. So, God exists. 😊
There are quite a few objections (quantum mechanics, questions about actuality etc.) that can be launched against parts of this argument, however, this isn’t the place to address them. I already overreached by including this section, but it’s kind of a lay-up to 5.2 and there was merit to including it. I’ll address the more common objections much later on, but if anyone is itching to see those objections for themselves, they can read Ed Feser’s book themselves. The above is a summarized (as much as I could) form of the argument, and he does explain things better there than I did here.

Regardless, I hope you enjoyed reading, and I hope this made you think.

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1. I feel like I speedran this section here, but I’m trying my best not to overwhelm people with technical terminology whilst trying to maintain some semblance of the original argument. If you want a better treatment of these ideas you’ll want to read the first argument in Dr. Feser’s Five Proofs. For an even more detailed exposition, you’ll find that in Chapter 1 – Scholastic Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction – Dr. Ed Feser
He is Risen – 5.1.1: A Strange, but Powerful Argument for God, ft. Aquinas, Aristotle, prod. Dr. Feser (1/2)

Jun 22nd, 2025
*AI Generated image*

I debated whether to include this here since it’s marginally off-topic, but considering 5.2.1, I thought it made sense to lay the foundation of the reasoning here before I got there. Here, I present a summarised form of Dr. Ed Feser’s “Thomistic Proof” for God’s existence, aiming to show why everything, right here, right now, ultimately depends on God for its existence.

It’s not my favourite proof, but I think it has its merits and ultimately does the trick. For a better and more in-depth analysis of the argument – you’ll want to go to Chapter 4. The Thomistic Proof – Five Proofs of the Existence of God (Ed Feser).

also im kinda tired of saying i have good arguments for God but not actually showing them

Warning: It’s quite technical, but I like to view metaphysics like mathematics. It’s hard, but the merits of some metaphysical investigations can heavily outweigh the costs.

A brief note – I’ll often use the words ‘essence’, ‘definition’ and ‘nature’ interchangeably. More often than not they can be used as such, but if there’s a need to use one specifically then I’ll say so.

Stage 1: Analysing Stuff

We experience stuff in reality, which really is stuff. We know that things such as trees, stones, and other humans really exist as things outside of our minds, and we know what they are – i.e., their “essence”. For example, a brief Google search defines a tree as “a perennial woody plant having a main trunk and usually a distinct crown”. Now, whether you agree with this exact definition isn’t the main point. The main point is that certain things have certain characteristics that distinguish themselves from others, such that we know one thing from another.

However, we also know that merely knowing what something is, doesn’t mean we also know that it is – i.e., that it exists. It’s not in the definition of a tree for it to also exist – they aren’t necessary. Therefore, we can say:
1. For any of the things we know from experience (stones, trees, etc.) there is a distinction to be drawn between its essence and its existence.
But what type of distinction is it? For example, the morning star and the evening star (the planet Venus) are the same thing outside of the mind, or extramentally. Those two names refer to the same real thing. However, merely by using different words to refer to it, we must be distinguishing between something, right? Otherwise, we wouldn’t notice a difference between the two phrases. This kind of distinction can be called a logical distinction, where the phrases refer to the same thing in reality, but the only distinction is mind-dependent, or intramental.

Is the essence-existence distinction also a logical distinction? No, for reasons stated earlier. Merely knowing what a thing is (its essence, or nature) doesn’t mean you know that it also exists. This type of distinction can be called a real distinction, where there is an extramental distinction. We can say:
1. If this were not a real distinction (a distinction in extramental reality) we could know whether a thing exists simply by knowing its essence.
2. But we cannot know whether or not a thing exists by knowing its essence.
Repeating what I said earlier – we know that if something’s essence and existence were the same thing in reality, then it would exist necessarily. It would be literally in its definition (or essence) for it to exist:
1. If it were not a real distinction, then the things we know from experience would exist in a necessary way rather than a merely contingent (non-necessary) way.
2. But in fact they exist in a merely contingent way and not in a necessary way.
Another reason as to why there must be a real distinction between something’s essence and its existence (at least for each of the things we know through experience) would be that if this were not the case, then there cannot be in principle more than one such thing.

Here’s why:

Remember how the morning star and the evening star (in not being really distinct) refer to the same thing in reality? The same would go for essence and existence. If they are not really distinct, then that something’s essence literally is its existence.

Now, let’s say there are two such things, A and B, where this is the case. How would you differentiate them? You might say A has the essence of [whatever A is], and it exists, while B has the essence of [whatever B is], and it also exists. However, remember that in this case, the essence and existence would have to be the same thing, and so the essence (or definition) of A, is simply that it exists. The same thing goes B, but notice that there’s no longer anything left to differentiate the two of them, and so they’re actually just identical!

So, if there exists something that has its essence identical to its existence, there can only be one such thing:
1. If there could be more than one thing the essence of which is identical to its existence, then two or more such things would be distinguishable in the way that species of the same genus are distinguished, or members of the same species are distinguished.^[1]
2. But they cannot be distinguished in any of these ways
3. So, there could not, in principle, be more than one thing the essence of which is identical to its existence.
And, just for formality, we’ll restate the things we’ve already considered more clearly.
1. So, for any of the things we know from experience, if the distinction between its essence and existence were not a real distinction, then there could not be, in principle, more than one of them.
2. But for each of the things we know from experience, there is, or could be more than one of them.
3. So, for each of the things we know from experience, the distinction between its essence and existence is a real distinction.
Before we continue, it might be good to clarify one (rather crucial) thing. Just because two things are really distinct from one another, doesn’t mean that they can be separated.

One such example might be a circle’s radius and its circumference – these two things are not the same thing (since C = 2πr), however (quite obviously) you can’t have one without having the other – they’re quite literally dependent on each other.

Following on from that, in extramental reality, there’s no such thing as something’s essence existing apart from its existence – that doesn’t really make any sense whatsoever. You can’t separate the essence of a stone or human from its existence, right?

But if this is the case – how do things “get” their existence? We’ve concluded, quite obviously, that the things of our experience do not exist necessarily – but how is it that something’s essence is combined with its existence?

One possible answer is a brute assertion – just like with a circle’s radius and its circumference, the things of our experience are simply inseparable and are simply never apart.

The problem is, this doesn’t really answer the question, because it’s natural to just ask why it is the case that these things aren’t separable. In the case of a circle, its radius and circumference are mathematically related, but that doesn’t seem to be the case for a stone, does it?

We can also note that the things of our experience cannot impart, or give, existence to themselves. In that case, they would have to already exist – but we’ve already noted that things that have their existence really distinct from their essence can’t give existence to anything unless they already exist. They would have to exist before it exists, and I think it’s quite clear that such a possibility isn’t coherent – nothing can be the cause of its own existence. Let’s write this more clearly:
1. For anything the essence of which is really distinct from its existence, the existence must be imparted to it either by itself or by some cause distinct from it.
2. But if it imparted existence to itself, it would be the cause of itself.
3. Nothing can be the cause of itself.
4. So, it cannot impart existence to itself.
Therefore, for anything in which there is a real distinction between its essence and its existence, its cause of existence must be from outside of it – let’s call this thing being caused, thing A. One thing to note though, is that whatever causes this thing to exist, let’s call it, the causer, thing B, mustn’t just exist before thing A comes into existence, it has to exist while thing A is in existence. We’ve already determined that thing A cannot cause its own existence, so at any point in time that something exists – i.e., here and now, thing A must have a cause of its existence (B) which isn’t thing A but is imparting existence to A’s essence.

The same thing might be said for B, its cause at a given time, or simultaneous cause, might be C, and so on. Let’s pause and write this more formally first:
1. So, for anything the essence of which is really distinct from its existence, the existence must be imparted to it by some cause distinct from it.
2. Since its essence and existence remain really distinct at every moment at which it exists, including here and now, its existence must be imparted to it by some cause distinct from it at every moment at which it exists, including here and now.
3. So, for each of the things we know from experience, its existence must be imparted to it by some cause distinct from it at every moment at which it exists, including here and now.
But can this series go on forever – no, I don’t think this so, and here’s why. I think we can distinguish between two types of causal series.
1. A per accidens series – this would be a series in which each member is not simultaneously dependent on a previous member’s existence at a given time for its causal power. One such example might be a family tree – if your great-great-grandparent passes away, it doesn’t remove your ability to reproduce.
  - Interestingly enough, the original proponent of this argument (St. Thomas Aquinas) thought that time might be a per accidens series – so he probably wasn’t very convinced by the popular Kalam Cosmological argument.
2. A per se series – this would be a series in which each member is simultaneously dependent on a previous member’s existence for its causal power. An analogy might be a coat which is hung on a hanger, which is hung on a rack etc. If any member of this structure is not supported by another structure (i.e., a foundation or something), the structure as a whole is not supported.
I think, and with good reason, that existence is a per se series. If at any given moment, something of our experience is not supported, or concurrently caused by another thing, then we can easily start to wonder why, or how, the series as a whole actually exists.

Now, the reason that a per se series cannot continue infinitely is based on pretty much what I just said. It doesn’t matter how many more “supporters” you add to make the coat hang – if there is nothing that supports the whole structure at a given time (whether it’s some magnetic force or whatever), it falls. The per se series, therefore, must end with a primary cause, something uncaused.

We’ve already noted that whatever this thing is, its essence cannot be really distinct from its existence (as therefore it would not be primary and would itself require a concurrent cause) and so its essence must be really identical with its existence or, as more fancily said by St. Thomas Aquinas, subsistent existence itself.

Essentially, right here and now, all the things of our experience, with a real distinction between their essence and existence can trace their existence back to this cause, and this cause…is God. The next post will show why we can make that leap, but just to clarify:
1. Either this cause is itself something the essence of which is distinct from its existence, or it is something whose essence and existence are identical (something that just is subsistent existence itself)
2. If this cause is something the essence of which is distinct from its existence, then its own existence too must be imparted to it by some cause distinct from it at every moment at which it exists including here and now.
3. The causal series this would generate would be a hierarchical (per se) one, which cannot regress infinitely, but must have a first member.
4. The first member could only be something whose essence and existence are identical, something that just is subsistent existence itself.
5. So, either directly or indirectly, each of the things we know from experience has its existence imparted to it at every moment at which it exists, including here and now, by some cause whose essence and existence are identical, something that just is subsistent existence itself.
That’s part 1, part 2 should show us how to get to something like the classical conception of God.

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1. To fully understand this fancy terminology, and for a more in-depth analysis of why this is the case you’ll want to check out Ed Feser’s explanation on pages 108-110 of his book. I’m trying to keep the word count minimal here 😊. I think the unemboldened part of the premise is decently justified based on what I’ve already said.
He is Risen – 4.3: Who does he think he is (John)?

May 25th, 2025
The Gospel of John is by far the easiest Gospel to mine divinity quotes from, and I do have a theory as to why this specific gospel, as opposed to others, is littered with them.

Late, High Christology?

I think the development of the “I am” sayings can also be chalked up to Jewish precedent. We’ve demonstrated that they have some precedent in Mark, but with Jewish persecution and Christianity being persecuted during the 60s, and heavily in the late 60’s with the Neronian flavour (when the synoptics (Matthew, Mark, Luke) are argued to have been written by many scholars) by the 80/90s, post the destruction of the Jewish temple, its plausible that Christians may have had more theological “freedom” to more clearly expound Jesus’ claims to divinity.

Only in the Gospel of John?

Another point I want to highlight and that is semi-related to the above is what I’ve discovered is a rather interesting position. It goes like this:

“John has a lot of ‘divine’ statements, therefore John is not historically reliable”.

You won’t often hear it phrased like this, but you do hear people start to doubt John’s credibility simply because he has a higher concentration of divine statements in his gospel. However, this sort of scepticism is contradictory, simply because it’s an arbitrary standard that doesn’t entail historical reliability or unreliability. All the Gospels are unique in some way, but why does a higher concentration of divine statements somehow necessarily reduce John’s credibility?

The ’Contradictions’ Argument

In a debate that Bart Ehrman had with Peter Williams, he pushed his ‘contradictions argument’ (which he usually does to discredit the historicity of the Gospels). The issue with this sort of argument is that Bart can’t claim that there are contradictions (which is at a logical level) and then later claim that implausible explanations should be dismissed. If one proposes a contradiction, it doesn’t matter how implausible my explanation is (at least, when we’re dealing with a possibly supernatural text. and there are many plausible ones), the interlocutor just needs to offer an explanation that is not logically contradictory to refute one’s claim. The explanation may reduce the posterior probability of the event at hand, but that’s not an issue if one is pushing an argument as strong as claiming logical contradictions.

Without further adieu, I’ll highlight what I think are the most impactful passages in this Gospel regarding Jesus’ self image.
1. John 5:17-18, 22-23
‘ So he told them, “My Father is working until now, and I too am working.” For this reason the Jewish leaders were trying even harder to kill him, because not only was he breaking the Sabbath, but he was also calling God his own Father, thus making himself equal with God.’
17-18

‘ Furthermore, the Father does not judge anyone, but has assigned all judgment to the Son, so that all people will honor the Son just as they honor the Father. The one who does not honor the Son does not honor the Father who sent him.’
22-23

I feel like John’s making my own points for me. He highlights that Jesus’ idea that he had the authority to break the Sabbath without consequence and familial language used with reference to the Father designate that he clearly is putting himself on the same stool as God the Father.

Secondly, although we do see some individuals in the Old Testament referring to God as the ‘Father’, such as Isaiah 63:16 and Isaiah 64:8 – both of these passages use the term ‘our Father’. John seems to note that Jesus’ use of the term ‘My Father’ in the presence of those around him is especially significant. The following verses support this reasoning, because in verse 23 above we see that this ‘Son’ that Jesus refers to is to be honoured in the same way as the Father. If he meant ‘Son’ in an adoptive sense (like the spiritual sense we are all ‘sons’ and ‘daughters’ of God) then it doesn’t make sense to say that all of us as ‘Sons’ would be honoured in the same way as the Father. What makes much more sense is that Jesus’ sonship is distinct and divine.
1. John 8:57-9
‘ Then the Judeans replied, “You are not yet fifty years old! Have you seen Abraham?” Jesus said to them, “I tell you the solemn truth, before Abraham came into existence, I am!” Then they picked up stones to throw at him, but Jesus hid himself and went out from the temple area.’

You’re strapped to a wooden chair with a blindfold on and you don’t know where you are. You’re being interrogated, and the interrogator says:

“This is your last chance. One verse. What one verse definitively proves that Jesus claimed to be God in the gospel of John – get it wrong, and I’ll blast your head off.”

The interrogator flips the safety on his gun and presses it to your temple, but you’re unfazed. Cooly and calmly, you respond.

“John 8:58.”

The interrogator lowers his handgun and begins to clap slowly.

Anyway.

If you read the verse above, you’d see why this verse was virtually a slam dunk with respect to Jesus’ divine self-image – not only does Jesus claim a form of pre-existence (which is something that Jewish theology about that time did not ascribe to mortal beings) but he seems to quite literally use the exact same phrase that God used to name himself to Moses in Exodus 3:14:

‘ Moses said to God, “If I go to the Israelites and tell them, ‘The God of your fathers has sent me to you,’ and they ask me, ‘What is his name?’ – what should I say to them?” God said to Moses, “ I am that I am .” And he said, “You must say this to the Israelites, ‘ I am has sent me to you.’” ‘

And, to be sure, they intended to stone him to death – but why would they do that if what he said didn’t count as blasphemy?
1. John 10:18 (the greatest passage in the Bible (unbiased take))
‘ No one takes [my life] away from me, but I lay it down of my own free will. I have the authority to lay it down, and I have the authority to take it back again. This commandment I received from my Father.”’

Here we have the greatest verse in the Bible. There aren’t many (if any) individuals that have the authority or power to ‘lay down’ their life and ‘take it back again’. Understandably, the Jewish people surrounding him were confused – thinking that he was ‘possessed by a demon’. It’s not like they would understand how it would be possible for someone to die and somehow ‘raise himself’ back to life. However, the sort of being that can ‘lay down’ his own human life and ‘take it back again’ is surely something supernatural, and it’s not clear how Angels would have this sort of ability.
1. John 10:30
“’ The Father and I are one.”’

Another verse that frequently appears in these sorts of debates is the one above. Often, the counter is that claiming to be ‘one’ with someone does not entail (in this case) that Jesus is also God, they could just share the same purpose. Generally, I think this is actually a valid response, until you keep reading the text and see the reaction of the crowd in verse 33:

‘ The Jewish leaders replied, “We are not going to stone you for a good deed but for blasphemy, because you, a man, are claiming to be God.”’

The verses following this show a little bit more squabble between the two parties, but the end of verse 38 along with the above verse really do seem to confirm that Jesus was making a divine claim.

‘ But if I do them, even if you do not believe me, believe the deeds, so that you may come to know and understand that I am in the Father and the Father is in me.” ‘

I’ll leave you to guess how they reacted.
1. John 17:1-5
‘ When Jesus had finished saying these things, he looked upward to heaven and said, “Father, the time has come. Glorify your Son, so that your Son may glorify you – just as you have given him authority over all humanity, so that he may give eternal life to everyone you have given him. Now this is eternal life – that they know you, the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom you sent. I glorified you on earth by completing the work you gave me to do. And now, Father, glorify me at your side with the glory I had with you before the world was created.’

This is another verse that tends to get a lot of attention in these debates. Oftentimes, counterarguments press on verse 3, where Jesus refers to the Father as ‘the only true God’. In a context where God is necessarily one person, this more or less would seal the deal, however, such an interpretation would struggle with verse 5, specifically where Jesus asks that the Father ‘glorify him at [his] side with the glory [he] had with [him] before the world was created’. To my knowledge, pre-existence was reserved for God and God alone, so a theology that only accepts one person in God can’t make sense of this verse. A theology that accepts more than one, however…

A brief note from Jewish sources

You might be surprised to hear that it wasn’t just Christian sources that (may) corroborate Jesus’ status as a miracle worker. The Toledot Yeshu (ספר תולדות ישו), is a medieval text that presents an alternative and moderately anti-Christian view of Jesus’ life. There are quite a few versions, but it’s not considered canonical/normative within Rabbinic literature. Strangely, it does acknowledge Jesus’ status as a miracle worker, but attributes these miracles to sorcery:

“After that, the people of the Galilee made birds of clay in their presence; [Yeshu] pronounced the Shemhameforas over them and those birds instantly flew away”^[1]

That’s part 4 done! The next part will start to get into the actual meat of this topic. So far, all we’ve done is lay groundwork. We’ve established that the Gospels are historically reliable, that Jesus died by Crucifixion, that there is good reason to believe that traditional authorship is correct, and that Jesus claimed to be God. If you make it this far, I salute you, and thanks for reading,

Rookie

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1 – Meerson. M, Schäfer. P, Toledot Yeshu: The Life Story of Jesus, p. 22, available at: https://api.pageplace.de/preview/DT0400.9783161587276_A40600688/preview-9783161587276_A40600688.pdf (accessed 02.02.2025)

He is Risen – 5.2.2: Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence (sort of)

He is Risen – 5.2.1: The Metaphysics of Miracles

He is Risen – 5.1.2: A Strange, but Powerful Argument for God, ft. Aquinas, Aristotle, prod. Dr. Feser (2/2)

He is Risen – 5.1.1: A Strange, but Powerful Argument for God, ft. Aquinas, Aristotle, prod. Dr. Feser (1/2)

He is Risen – 4.3: Who does he think he is (John)?