*AI Generated image*

I debated whether to include this here since it’s marginally off-topic, but considering 5.2.1, I thought it made sense to lay the foundation of the reasoning here before I got there. Here, I present a summarised form of Dr. Ed Feser’s “Thomistic Proof” for God’s existence, aiming to show why everything, right here, right now, ultimately depends on God for its existence.

It’s not my favourite proof, but I think it has its merits and ultimately does the trick. For a better and more in-depth analysis of the argument – you’ll want to go to Chapter 4. The Thomistic Proof – Five Proofs of the Existence of God (Ed Feser).

also im kinda tired of saying i have good arguments for God but not actually showing them

Warning: It’s quite technical, but I like to view metaphysics like mathematics. It’s hard, but the merits of some metaphysical investigations can heavily outweigh the costs.

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A brief note – I’ll often use the words ‘essence’, ‘definition’ and ‘nature’ interchangeably. More often than not they can be used as such, but if there’s a need to use one specifically then I’ll say so.

Stage 1: Analysing Stuff

We experience stuff in reality, which really is stuff. We know that things such as trees, stones, and other humans really exist as things outside of our minds, and we know what they are – i.e., their “essence”. For example, a brief Google search defines a tree as “a perennial woody plant having a main trunk and usually a distinct crown”. Now, whether you agree with this exact definition isn’t the main point. The main point is that certain things have certain characteristics that distinguish themselves from others, such that we know one thing from another.

However, we also know that merely knowing what something is, doesn’t mean we also know that it is – i.e., that it exists. It’s not in the definition of a tree for it to also exist – they aren’t necessary. Therefore, we can say:

1. For any of the things we know from experience (stones, trees, etc.) there is a distinction to be drawn between its essence and its existence.

But what type of distinction is it? For example, the morning star and the evening star (the planet Venus) are the same thing outside of the mind, or extramentally. Those two names refer to the same real thing. However, merely by using different words to refer to it, we must be distinguishing between something, right? Otherwise, we wouldn’t notice a difference between the two phrases. This kind of distinction can be called a logical distinction, where the phrases refer to the same thing in reality, but the only distinction is mind-dependent, or intramental.

Is the essence-existence distinction also a logical distinction? No, for reasons stated earlier. Merely knowing what a thing is (its essence, or nature) doesn’t mean you know that it also exists. This type of distinction can be called a real distinction, where there is an extramental distinction. We can say:

2. If this were not a real distinction (a distinction in extramental reality) we could know whether a thing exists simply by knowing its essence.
3. But we cannot know whether or not a thing exists by knowing its essence.

Repeating what I said earlier – we know that if something’s essence and existence were the same thing in reality, then it would exist necessarily. It would be literally in its definition (or essence) for it to exist:

4. If it were not a real distinction, then the things we know from experience would exist in a necessary way rather than a merely contingent (non-necessary) way.
5. But in fact they exist in a merely contingent way and not in a necessary way.

Another reason as to why there must be a real distinction between something’s essence and its existence (at least for each of the things we know through experience) would be that if this were not the case, then there cannot be in principle more than one such thing.

Here’s why:

Remember how the morning star and the evening star (in not being really distinct) refer to the same thing in reality? The same would go for essence and existence. If they are not really distinct, then that something’s essence literally is its existence.

Now, let’s say there are two such things, A and B, where this is the case. How would you differentiate them? You might say A has the essence of [whatever A is], and it exists, while B has the essence of [whatever B is], and it also exists. However, remember that in this case, the essence and existence would have to be the same thing, and so the essence (or definition) of A, is simply that it exists. The same thing goes B, but notice that there’s no longer anything left to differentiate the two of them, and so they’re actually just identical!

So, if there exists something that has its essence identical to its existence, there can only be one such thing:

6. If there could be more than one thing the essence of which is identical to its existence, then two or more such things would be distinguishable in the way that species of the same genus are distinguished, or members of the same species are distinguished.^[1]
7. But they cannot be distinguished in any of these ways
8. So, there could not, in principle, be more than one thing the essence of which is identical to its existence.

And, just for formality, we’ll restate the things we’ve already considered more clearly.

9. So, for any of the things we know from experience, if the distinction between its essence and existence were not a real distinction, then there could not be, in principle, more than one of them.
10. But for each of the things we know from experience, there is, or could be more than one of them.
11. So, for each of the things we know from experience, the distinction between its essence and existence is a real distinction.

Before we continue, it might be good to clarify one (rather crucial) thing. Just because two things are really distinct from one another, doesn’t mean that they can be separated.

One such example might be a circle’s radius and its circumference – these two things are not the same thing (since C = 2πr), however (quite obviously) you can’t have one without having the other – they’re quite literally dependent on each other.

Following on from that, in extramental reality, there’s no such thing as something’s essence existing apart from its existence – that doesn’t really make any sense whatsoever. You can’t separate the essence of a stone or human from its existence, right?

But if this is the case – how do things “get” their existence? We’ve concluded, quite obviously, that the things of our experience do not exist necessarily – but how is it that something’s essence is combined with its existence?

One possible answer is a brute assertion – just like with a circle’s radius and its circumference, the things of our experience are simply inseparable and are simply never apart.

The problem is, this doesn’t really answer the question, because it’s natural to just ask why it is the case that these things aren’t separable. In the case of a circle, its radius and circumference are mathematically related, but that doesn’t seem to be the case for a stone, does it?

We can also note that the things of our experience cannot impart, or give, existence to themselves. In that case, they would have to already exist – but we’ve already noted that things that have their existence really distinct from their essence can’t give existence to anything unless they already exist. They would have to exist before it exists, and I think it’s quite clear that such a possibility isn’t coherent – nothing can be the cause of its own existence. Let’s write this more clearly:

12. For anything the essence of which is really distinct from its existence, the existence must be imparted to it either by itself or by some cause distinct from it.
13. But if it imparted existence to itself, it would be the cause of itself.
14. Nothing can be the cause of itself.
15. So, it cannot impart existence to itself.

Therefore, for anything in which there is a real distinction between its essence and its existence, its cause of existence must be from outside of it – let’s call this thing being caused, thing A. One thing to note though, is that whatever causes this thing to exist, let’s call it, the causer, thing B, mustn’t just exist before thing A comes into existence, it has to exist while thing A is in existence. We’ve already determined that thing A cannot cause its own existence, so at any point in time that something exists – i.e., here and now, thing A must have a cause of its existence (B) which isn’t thing A but is imparting existence to A’s essence.

The same thing might be said for B, its cause at a given time, or simultaneous cause, might be C, and so on. Let’s pause and write this more formally first:

16. So, for anything the essence of which is really distinct from its existence, the existence must be imparted to it by some cause distinct from it.
17. Since its essence and existence remain really distinct at every moment at which it exists, including here and now, its existence must be imparted to it by some cause distinct from it at every moment at which it exists, including here and now.
18. So, for each of the things we know from experience, its existence must be imparted to it by some cause distinct from it at every moment at which it exists, including here and now.

But can this series go on forever – no, I don’t think this so, and here’s why. I think we can distinguish between two types of causal series.

1. A per accidens series – this would be a series in which each member is not simultaneously dependent on a previous member’s existence at a given time for its causal power. One such example might be a family tree – if your great-great-grandparent passes away, it doesn’t remove your ability to reproduce.
   • Interestingly enough, the original proponent of this argument (St. Thomas Aquinas) thought that time might be a per accidens series – so he probably wasn’t very convinced by the popular Kalam Cosmological argument.
2. A per se series – this would be a series in which each member is simultaneously dependent on a previous member’s existence for its causal power. An analogy might be a coat which is hung on a hanger, which is hung on a rack etc. If any member of this structure is not supported by another structure (i.e., a foundation or something), the structure as a whole is not supported.

I think, and with good reason, that existence is a per se series. If at any given moment, something of our experience is not supported, or concurrently caused by another thing, then we can easily start to wonder why, or how, the series as a whole actually exists.

Now, the reason that a per se series cannot continue infinitely is based on pretty much what I just said. It doesn’t matter how many more “supporters” you add to make the coat hang – if there is nothing that supports the whole structure at a given time (whether it’s some magnetic force or whatever), it falls. The per se series, therefore, must end with a primary cause, something uncaused.

We’ve already noted that whatever this thing is, its essence cannot be really distinct from its existence (as therefore it would not be primary and would itself require a concurrent cause) and so its essence must be really identical with its existence or, as more fancily said by St. Thomas Aquinas, subsistent existence itself.

Essentially, right here and now, all the things of our experience, with a real distinction between their essence and existence can trace their existence back to this cause, and this cause…is God. The next post will show why we can make that leap, but just to clarify:

19. Either this cause is itself something the essence of which is distinct from its existence, or it is something whose essence and existence are identical (something that just is subsistent existence itself)
20. If this cause is something the essence of which is distinct from its existence, then its own existence too must be imparted to it by some cause distinct from it at every moment at which it exists including here and now.
21. The causal series this would generate would be a hierarchical (per se) one, which cannot regress infinitely, but must have a first member.
22. The first member could only be something whose essence and existence are identical, something that just is subsistent existence itself.
23. So, either directly or indirectly, each of the things we know from experience has its existence imparted to it at every moment at which it exists, including here and now, by some cause whose essence and existence are identical, something that just is subsistent existence itself.

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That’s part 1, part 2 should show us how to get to something like the classical conception of God.

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1. To fully understand this fancy terminology, and for a more in-depth analysis of why this is the case you’ll want to check out Ed Feser’s explanation on pages 108-110 of his book. I’m trying to keep the word count minimal here 😊. I think the unemboldened part of the premise is decently justified based on what I’ve already said.