He is Risen – 5.1.2: A Strange, but Powerful Argument for God, ft. Aquinas, Aristotle, prod. Dr. Feser (2/2)

*AI Generated image*

“Now what?”

Good question. Now would be a good point to summarise what we’ve confirmed so far, but doing so would cut out necessary detail to the point that the argument presented wouldn’t have much force. If you’re just joining here, you can skim through the numbered points of the previous post and get a general gist of how we got here.


Stage 2: Concluding on stuff

In points 6-8 of the previous post, we proved that whatever this subsistent existence is, there can only, in principle, be one of them. Thus far, we know that this cause is unique and uncaused, but can we know anything else?

Well, we know that since there can only be one of these subsistent existences, that everything that is not this subsistent existence, must have a real distinction between its essence and existence, but that also means that at any point in time, everything that is not this subsistent existence is dependent on it for its existence. We also know from previous reflection that this subsistent existence is necessarily existing as (1) it is uncaused, and (2) its essence is its existence – its “definition” genuinely is existence – it could not fail to exist. Let’s scribble this down:

  1. Since there cannot, in principle, be more than one thing the essence of which is identical to its existence, this cause (which is subsistent existence itself) is unique.
  2. Since it is unique, anything other than it that exists must be something the essence of which is distinct from its existence.
  3. Anything the essence of which is distinct from its existence will, either directly or indirectly, have its existence imparted to it by a cause which is subsistent existence itself.
  4. So, this unique cause which is subsistent existence itself is the cause of everything other than itself.
  5. Since whatever lacks a real distinction between its essence and existence would exist in a necessary way rather than a contingent way, this unique cause which is subsistent existence itself exists in a necessary way.
  6. Whatever is subsistent existence itself need not and could not have a cause of its own.
  7. So, this unique cause, which is subsistent existence itself, is uncaused.

Now, consider this – the things of our experience whose essence is distinct from their existence are related by actuality and potentiality.

What on earth does that mean, you ask?

These are terms coined by Aristotle. To summarise:

  • Actuality describes how something is at a given instant. For example, a coffee cup you hold in your hand might be hot.
  • Potentiality describes how something could be. The same coffee cup could be warm, cold, frozen, etc – but for obvious reasons, it can’t be cold and hot at the same time. It’s only when something that is actually cold (such as ice) actualizes, the mug’s potential to be cold, that it becomes cold (albeit slowly).[1]

Brace yourself, because I’m about to use the words “potential” and “actual” about a thousand times from here on out.

Similarly, essence and existence are related by potentiality and actuality. Something’s essence (at least, when it is really distinct to its existence) only really amounts to a potential thing – it could or could not be. It’s only when something actualizes its potential to exist (gives it existence) that it actually exists. We could then just say that existence is a kind of actuality, right?

If that’s the case, then something that is subsistent existence itself can be similarly considered to be pure actuality with no potentiality. This makes sense, because whatever this thing is, it is uncaused and could have no cause (as we have already noted) – it has no potentiality for existence. Formally:

  1. If that which is subsistent existence itself had some potentiality for existence which needed to be actualised, the existence would have to be imparted to it by some other cause.
  2. So, that which is subsistent existence itself has no potential for existence which needs actualisation but rather exists in a purely actual way.

So, if this purely actual being has no potential for existence, and its essence is identical to its existence, it can’t change – i.e., it’s immutable. Since existing strictly within time entails changeability, an immutable cause must also be eternal. It doesn’t “come to be” or “pass away”. It simply is. Furthermore, since being material (physical) also entails changeability (in size, shape, temperature, any material factor), this cause must also be immaterial, or incorporeal.

Onto the next big question. What is perfection?

Probably a year ago now I wrote an analysis of Slavery in the Old Testament, in which I also gave a definition of goodness. Part of this definition said goodness can be characterised as “the true actualisation of a subject’s potential – how well a subject reflects its ordained purpose”. You might not agree with this completely, but I think you’d agree that it’s at least reasonable. If someone doesn’t do what they’re supposed to do in some respect, then (depending on the matter of course), this is often considered a bad thing. Similarly, with objects (such as a phone with a broken screen), if they don’t work as they are intended, they are often considered defective, or imperfect.  A defect like this is called a privation – the absence of some feature a thing would naturally require to be “complete”. It involves the failure to realise some potential inherent in something.

On the flip side, if something were to be perfect, it wouldn’t have any privations or potential to fulfil and would possess maximal perfection. Since this cause is purely actual, it is maximally perfect, and fully good (as long as you consider goodness a perfection). Let’s summarize:

  1. For this purely actual cause to be capable of change, it would have to have potentials capable of actualisation.
  2. However, it is purely actual, so it lacks such potentials.
  3. So, it is immutable.
  4. If this purely actual cause existed in time, then it would be capable of change, which it is not.
  5. So, it is immaterial.
  6. If this purely actual cause were corporeal, then it would be material, which it is not.
  7. So, the purely actual cause is not corporeal.
  8. If the purely actual cause were imperfect in any way, it would have some unactualized potential, which being purely actual it does not have.
  9. So, the purely actual cause is perfect, or maximally perfect.
  10. For something to be less than fully good is for it to have a privation – that is, to fail to actualise some feature proper to it.
  11. The purely actual cause has no privation (which is an unactualized potential)
  12. So, the purely actual cause is fully good.

Moving onto power.

I think it’s reasonable to say that power is the ability to make something happen, or more formally, the ability to actualise some potential – to make something potential, actually the case. If the purely actual cause is the source of all existence except itself, and therefore (in some form) the source of all actualising power, it is omnipotent.

  1. To have power entails being able to actualise potential.
  2. Change is the actualisation of a potential, and actualises something’s potential to exist in a certain way.
  3. Any potential, including a potential for existence, that is actualised is either actualised by the purely actual cause or a series of actual causes which terminates in the purely actual cause.
  4. So, all power derives from the purely actual cause
  5. But to be that from which all power derives is to be omnipotent.
  6. So, the purely actual cause is omnipotent.

But, what on earth is this thing? Is it personal? Or is it just like the Sun, providing heat but pretty silent? There’s actually good reason to attribute intelligence to this cause, but first, we need to have some notion, or idea of that intelligence even is.

Traditionally (in the philosophical setting), intelligence involves:

  1. The ability to grasp concepts (e.g., the concept man – but not just a particular man, what it is to be a man in general – the universal idea that applies to all men, such as certain biological characteristics)
  2. The ability to merge concepts (e.g., the ability to combine man and mortal into the thought all men are mortal)
  3. The ability to infer one thought from the others (e.g., all men are mortal -> Socrates is a man -> Socrates is mortal)

Clearly, (1) is the most important, since (2) and (3) are dependent on it. It’s no use trying to merge concepts that you can’t grasp, or infer conclusions.

Continuing, it seems quite clear that concepts can be considered to be some kind of pattern, or form, that we are able to memorise and apply to multiple individuals.

Naturally, when these forms/patterns come to exist in material things, the results are those exact material objects, but when we think more generally about these forms or patterns, we are able to abstract away from all the different particular men we know and focus on the general pattern common to all men. This is the essence of strictly intellectual activity – the ability to have the universal or abstract form or pattern of a thing without being that kind of thing.

Hold that thought for a minute – we need to delve a little more into cause and effect to see where I’m going with this.

We briefly noted earlier that when something changes or caused to exist, a potential is actualised, and that something already actual must have actualised it – this principle can be referred to as the principle of causality. The principle of proportionate causality extends upon this quite logically, saying that a cause cannot give something that it does not have to an effect (even if it’s not present in the cause in the exact same way). A basic example might be that, I can’t give you a calculator if I myself do not have one, but there are three ways an effect can be present in its cause before it ends up in the effect. Let’s use the example of me giving you £20 (don’t get excited):

  1. Formally – Quite straightforward. I have a £20 note and give it to you, or two £10 notes, or four £5 notes (etcetera). I pass an instance of the form/pattern of £20 to you.
  2. Virtually – Here, I might not have £20 physically, but I might be able to Bank Transfer it – i.e., I don’t have the money on hand, but I have the power to get a hold of it.
  3. Eminently – Because of my glorious industry connections, I convince the Bank of England to let me manufacture my own £20 notes and give one to you. Here, not only do I have the ability to acquire already existing £20 notes, but I have the power to cause these to exist in the first place.

I’d contend that with regard to any effect, whatever is in it must have been in the cause in any of these three ways – going back to our purely actual cause, since everything that exists is going to trace its existence back to it (as it is the cause of everything other than itself), it would also need to be the cause (in some way) of all of the patterns, forms, or essences that everything materialises as, but not just what they are actually, what they are potentially – it doesn’t matter what a given thing materialises as, it must first be present (in some form) in this purely actual cause lying at the other end of the causal chain. To pause and summarize:

  1. Whatever is in an effect is in its cause in some way, whether formally, virtually, or eminently (according to the principle of proportionate causality).
  2. So, the purely actual cause is the cause of all things.
  3. So, the forms or patterns manifest in all the things it causes must in some way be in the purely actual actualizer.

I think it’s quite clear that the forms/patterns of things must exist in the purely actual cause in a universal, or abstract way – similarly to how we are able to extract universal ideas about objects as stated before. If the purely actual cause is able to do this, then it’s obvious how they can cause every possible pattern or form to actually exist, since they have the general pattern of everything that exists (somehow).

If you’re have a good memory, you’ll notice that this is exactly that capacity that is fundamental to intelligence – the ability to grasp concepts. Not just that, but it’s also the case that this purely actual cause must cause the relations between things – i.e., it doesn’t just cause men, but it also causes the fact that all men are mortal, or a cat being on that mat. But doesn’t this sound like something – like a thought? This would mean that everything that actually exists, exists in the purely actual cause in the same way a thought or plan might exist in our mind before we do it – at least eminently or virtually if not formally (since God is not a man, or a cat, as he is not material).

This sounds a lot like another divine attribute – omniscience. And that’s what it is! Every possible pattern, or form, or essence exists in this purely actual cause in some way analogous to the way a thought exists in us.

  1. The forms or patterns can exist either in the concrete way in which they exist in particular things, or in an abstract way (intellectual).
  2. They cannot exist in the purely actual way in the same way they exist in individual things (formally), as something would cause itself otherwise.
  3. So, they must exist in an abstract (intellectual) way.
  4. So, the purely actual actualizer has intellect/intelligence.
  5. Since it is the forms/patterns of all things that are in the thought of this intellect, there is nothing that is outside the range of those thoughts.
  6. For nothing to be outside of those thoughts is for that thing to be omniscient.
  7. So the purely actual cause is omniscient.
  8. So each of the things of our experience has its existence imparted to it at every moment by a cause which is subsistent existence itself, one, necessarily existing,  an (or better said, “the”) uncaused cause of everything other than itself, purely actual, immutable, eternal immaterial, incorporeal, perfect, omnipotent, fully good, intelligent, and omniscient.
  9. But for there to be such a cause is for God to exist.
  10. So, God exists. 😊

There are quite a few objections (quantum mechanics, questions about actuality etc.) that can be launched against parts of this argument, however, this isn’t the place to address them. I already overreached by including this section, but it’s kind of a lay-up to 5.2 and there was merit to including it. I’ll address the more common objections much later on, but if anyone is itching to see those objections for themselves, they can read Ed Feser’s book themselves. The above is a summarized (as much as I could) form of the argument, and he does explain things better there than I did here.

Regardless, I hope you enjoyed reading, and I hope this made you think.



  1. I feel like I speedran this section here, but I’m trying my best not to overwhelm people with technical terminology whilst trying to maintain some semblance of the original argument. If you want a better treatment of these ideas you’ll want to read the first argument in Dr. Feser’s Five Proofs. For an even more detailed exposition, you’ll find that in Chapter 1Scholastic Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction – Dr. Ed Feser


One response to “He is Risen – 5.1.2: A Strange, but Powerful Argument for God, ft. Aquinas, Aristotle, prod. Dr. Feser (2/2)”

  1. And still no evidence for your god existing. It’s notable that christians have nothing but these “philosophical arguments”, which can never be shown to be valid. They cannot show that there is any such thing as an “essence”, so they are simply making things up. They try to baffle with BS, or as said by Nietzche: ““They muddy the water, to make it seem deep.””

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